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Challenges of financial globalisation and dollarisation 
for monetary policy: the case of Peru 
Julio Velarde 
During the last decade, the financial system of Peru has become more integrated with the global 
financial system, as reflected in growth in dollar deposits. Over the same period, following an episode 
of hyperinflation (1988-90) and confiscation of dollar deposits (1985), the level of financial 
intermediation in the Peruvian banking system recovered and reached its highest recorded level 
(25% of GDP) in 2002. This paper reviews Peru’s monetary policy experience in such an environment. 
In particular, the gradual reduction of financial dollarisation in the context of the recent adoption of an 
inflation targeting regime and the development of capital markets in local currency are discussed. 
Evolution of the Peruvian financial system 
Recovery of financial intermediation 
Ensuring the financial system’s ability to provide financial intermediation services has posed an 
important challenge for Peru. As a result of hyperinflation in 1988-90 and confiscation of dollar 
deposits in 1985, broad money had fallen to only 6% of GDP by 1990. The financial system recovered 
gradually, so that by 2002 the ratio of broad money to GDP had reached 25%, its highest recorded 
level (Graph 1). However, this indicator of financial intermediation is still lower than for most countries 
in the Latin American region. 
Graph 1 
Broad money
































The recovery in financial intermediation was driven mainly by an increase in dollar deposits, resulting 
from the repatriation of Peruvian residents’ deposits held abroad and the bank multiplier effect. A 
stabilisation programme, the restructuring of debts with foreign creditors and economic reforms 
improved confidence in the local financial system. Reforms included the liberalisation of the capital 
account (which included lifting restrictions on international capital flows and on holding foreign 
currency), the elimination of financial repression via the liberalisation of interest rates, the elimination 
of financial subsidies directed to specific sectors, the creation of a private pension system and the 
privatisation of state-owned banks. 
As a result, Peru achieved a higher integration with international financial markets, which in turn has 
led to increased foreign investment in the local banking system. The share of foreign capital in the 
banking system was nearly nil in the early 1990s, but now foreign investors control 62% of Peruvian 
banks (as of September 2003). Moreover, the make-up of the banking sector also changed: from 
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Banks have also regained access to international markets. Thus, the short-term external liabilities of 
commercial banks grew from USD 387 million in 1993 to almost USD 3 billion in 1997. As a result, 
dollar-denominated credit to the private sector has grown, and has exceeded total foreign currency 
deposits since 1996 (Graph 2). 
Graph 2 
Evolution of monetary aggregates of commercial 
banks in foreign currency: 1993-2002 
In billions of US dollars 
 
Financial integration has also led to the creation of derivatives markets, which, as in other emerging 
market economies, mainly involves the forward exchange market. Hedging with financial derivatives 
can help economic agents manage currency mismatches on their balance sheets. However, at the 
aggregate level the underlying exposure is not eliminated but transferred among residents. In this 
market, banks are the main suppliers because of their infrastructure and their participation in money 
and credit markets.  
Compared to those of other emerging market economies (eg Chile), the Peruvian forward exchange 
market is very small. However, relative to other domestic financial markets, it is significant. In the 
forward market, daily transactions average about USD 25 million. This mainly involves operations with 
clients (USD 20 million) and short (sell) forward contracts (USD 18 million). The daily average amount 
of interbank operations is about USD 5 million and responds to banks' partial hedging of their short 
positions with clients. Regarding the term structure, purchases are concentrated in the short term, 
while sales are distributed in terms up to one year. Liquidity for long-term operations (more than a 
year) is very thin. As at October 2003, the stock of banks’ sales to the public in the forward market is 
USD 949 million, while the stock of banks’ purchases is USD 358 million. 
The demand for forward cover exceeds supply largely because exporters, the potential sellers of short 
forwards, do not participate in the forward market since they are naturally hedged (their liabilities are 
dollarised, as discussed below). On the demand side, the main participants are corporate clients 
(utilities and commerce sector) and foreign clients with domestic investments.  
Impact of capital outflows on the financial sector 
Peru, like other countries, has faced external financial restrictions coming mainly from international 
crises. From 1997, capital inflows to emerging and transition markets diminished due to international 
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these shocks, was also affected by political crisis due to the presidential and congressional elections 
in 2000 and 2001. Short-term capital flows moved from an inflow of USD 3,583 million in 1993-97, to 
an outflow of USD 2,283 million in 1998-2000. 
As a result of capital outflows, the current account deficit dropped drastically from 6% to 3% of GDP 
between 1998 and 1999, while output growth turned negative in this period (Graphs 3 and 4). 
Graph 3 
Current account deficit 
As a percentage of GDP 
 
Graph 4 
Real GDP growth 
Year over year change, in per cent 
 
The depreciation of the real exchange rate following the external crises in 1998 (Graph 5), in a context 
of high dollarisation of assets and liabilities of households and firms, had a contractionary impact on 
the real sector of the economy through balance sheet effects.
1 
                                                       
1  A devaluation would increase the dollar-denominated liabilities of borrowers. If these borrowers earn income or hold assets 
denominated in local currency, their net worth will decline and this can lead to bankruptcy if the effect is sufficiently large. 
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Graph 5 
Multilateral real exchange rate index 
1994 = 100 
 
  Note: An increase indicates a depreciation. 
The negative effects of international and political crises were counteracted by Peruvian 
macroeconomic stability, the proper management of the exchange rate and a high level of 
international reserves. After the Russian crisis, Peru adopted a number of measures in response to 
slower capital inflows, such as reducing reserve requirements on foreign currency (which led to a 
decrease in international reserves of USD 1 billion between August and December 1998). However, 
the outflow of capital in the fourth quarter of 1998 and the resulting liquidity shortage resulted in a 
credit crunch: banks were reluctant to provide credit to the private sector, resulting in excess monetary 
reserves in the banking system. 
Preventive measures 
A dollarised financial system involves two risks that need to be addressed with prudential measures, 
including an adequate level of net international reserves: 
Currency mismatch risk. This requires the central bank to have the ability to reduce exchange rate 
volatility through its monetary and exchange rate operations.  
Risk of a bank run in dollar deposits. This requires that the central bank ensure that financial 
institutions have sufficient foreign currency funds available to maintain the confidence of depositors. 
This can be achieved by way of high reserve requirements on dollar-denominated deposits.  
In Peru, the central bank’s foreign reserves had increased prior to the international crises of the late 
1990s because privatisation proceeds were deposited with the central bank by the public sector. Net 
international reserves have grown in recent years, such that they now exceed the peak level reached 
before the external crisis of 1998 (Table 1). 
 
Table 1 
Net international reserves 
In millions of US dollars 
  1991 1994 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
1 
Net international reserves   1,302   5,718    10,169   9,183   8,404   8,180   8,613   9,598    10,496 
Net international position    –55   1,179   2,301   2,151   2,538   2,624   2,914   3,341   4,327 


















Public sector deposits    560   2,258   4,118   3,997   2,963   2,694   2,536   2,900   2,943 
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Apart from accumulating reserves, the central bank has set high reserve requirements on dollar 
deposits (about 30%). The country’s banking and insurance supervision institution (SBS) has also 
established a liquidity requirement on short-term dollar liabilities (20% of total short-term liabilities). 
The high reserve and liquidity requirements reduce the need for the central bank to act as a lender of 
last resort, which would be particularly challenging in a setting of high financial dollarisation.  
The availability of foreign reserves has permitted intervention in the foreign exchange market, which, 
along with high reserve requirements on dollar-denominated deposits, has attenuated the effects of 
external shocks on the economy. 
Monetary policy in a dollarised economy 
One of the most important issues associated with financial integration and monetary policy is a high 
degree of financial dollarisation (Graph 6). In Peru, dollarisation was caused by the high inflation 
experienced between 1975 and 1990, which prompted residents to turn to dollar-denominated assets 
as a store of value.  
Graph 6 
 
There are no capital controls or financial market restrictions in Peru. These types of controls are a 
sensitive issue for the Peruvian public, in part because the economy is dollarised, and also because of 
the poor experience with deposit confiscations in the 1960s and mid-1980s. 
The high financial dollarisation in Peru has a bearing on the effectiveness of monetary policy and the 
choice of exchange rate regime. One view is that a floating exchange rate is preferable to a peg or to 
full (de jure) dollarisation, because - in spite of high dollarisation - the type of dollarisation in Peru does 
not involve major currency substitution
2 and because real dollarisation in the Peruvian economy is low 
(eg the pass-through from exchange rate changes to inflation is low). An exchange rate freely 
determined by the market would insulate the economy from external shocks and allow for an 
independent monetary policy aimed at anchoring expected inflation. Moreover, some authors have 
argued that the way to achieve a permanent reduction in the degree of dollarisation is precisely to 
anchor expected inflation at low and stable levels. 
                                                       
2  Currency substitution involves the use of foreign currency as a means of payment or unit of account. Asset substitution 
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1  As of 30 September. 
Banking system’s broad money dollarisation 
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However, the balance sheet effect resulting from financial dollarisation is an important challenge to the 
independence of monetary policy. Large and abrupt exchange rate movements may destabilise 
financial markets, with adverse effects on real economic activity. Another important feature of 
dollarised economies is the lack of financial instruments denominated in domestic currency, especially 
at long maturities. 
The Central Reserve Bank of Peru has responded to these issues by adopting an explicit inflation 
targeting framework that combines an independent monetary policy with a floating exchange rate. The 
floating exchange rate regime reduces the possibility of a sharp depreciation associated with the 
collapse of a fixed exchange rate regime.  
The central bank intervenes in the foreign exchange market to smooth fluctuations or reduce volatility, 
but it avoids fixing the exchange rate at any specific level. It could be argued that intervention is not 
necessary as a bubble in the foreign exchange market would not be sustainable, and markets would 
correct any deviations from equilibrium. However, the transition period could unnecessarily endanger 
financial markets in a dollarised economy. 
That is the reason why the monetary policy regime in Peru has an “escape clause” to be applied in 
cases of extreme exchange rate volatility. This clause allows for a transitory increase in interbank 
interest rates in order to dampen speculation or calm markets. The escape clause was invoked in 
September 2002, when international uncertainty regarding presidential elections in Brazil induced 
volatility in the Peruvian foreign exchange market. 
Operating procedures 
In order to enhance the transparency of monetary policy, the central bank has changed its operating 
target from the money base to the level of the interbank interest rate (centre of a reference corridor), 
except in periods of financial stress when the “escape clause” is applied (Graphs 7 and 8). This 
approach has reduced the volatility of interbank rates (Table 2). The greater predictability of short-term 
interest rates in domestic currency (the new sol) has allowed the central bank to influence the 
evolution of the term structure of interest rates at longer maturities. 
Graph 7 
Interest rates in domestic currency 
August 2002-November 2003 
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Graph 8 
Interbank interest rate and 




Interbank interest rate 
In percentage points 
Year Average  Standard  deviation 
1998   19.0    6.6 
1999   14.9    4.8 
2000   12.7    2.5 
2001   8.6    0.9 
2002   3.2    0.5 
2003
1   3.5   0.1 
1  January-October. 
 
The central bank sells (buys) its own certificates of deposit (CDBCRPs) to withdraw (inject) liquidity 
into the system. Along with the CDBCRPs, liquidity is managed through short-term repurchase 
agreements and operations with treasury bills. At the end of the day, financial entities can make use of 
the following operations: 
•  Monetary regulation credits (“discount window”). These credits are designed to cover 
transitory liquidity shortages in financial entities. The discount rate is high enough to 
discourage the use of central bank funds and promote the interbank loan market.  
•  Transitory foreign currency purchases (“swaps”). The central bank purchases foreign 
currency from financial institutions with the commitment to buy it back the following day. The 
financial cost of this instrument is the highest between the domestic currency depreciation 
over the period in which the operation takes place and a commission established by the 
central bank. 
•  Overnight deposits (deposit facilities). Overnight deposits in both domestic and foreign 
currency at the central bank (one-day remunerated) contribute to monetary regulation by 
automatically absorbing liquidity surpluses and reducing the variability of commercial banks’ 
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Development of local capital markets 
The expansion of monetary operations with CDBCRPs has allowed the interest rate of these securities 
to become a benchmark (up to three years) in the domestic financial market. In 2003, the increased 
issuance of CDBCRPs did not crowd out private issuance due to the still large demand for 
sol-denominated securities, mainly from institutional investors. That benchmark has been 
complemented by the recent development of an active public debt market in domestic currency (for 
instance, a primary dealer programme was established at the beginning of 2003). The Treasury has 
placed domestic currency bonds in nominal terms (BTPs) with maturities up to five years (Graph 9). 
Graph 9 
Yield curve of domestic government bonds 
 
Institutional investors (banks and pension funds) are the most active participants in both the primary 
and secondary government debt markets. In particular, private pension funds (AFPs) have grown 
significantly since their creation in the early 1990s, becoming the main source of demand for securities 
in debt markets (Graph 10). 
Graph 10 
Evolution of private pension funds 
In millions of new soles 
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Following the issuance of treasury bonds and CDBCRPs with longer maturities, the private sector 
started to place corporate bonds in domestic currency at nominal interest rates for the first time; this is 
a better financial alternative because it allows companies to match their incomes and expenditures in 
terms of currencies. In 2000, 23% of securities were issued in new soles; this figure grew to around 
45% in 2002 (Table 3). 
 
Table 3 
Composition of private securities, in per cent
1 
Year Sales  Index  (VAC)  Dollars 
2000   1.6  20.5  77.9 
2001   10.9  17.9  71.3 
2002   13.0  17.2  69.8 
 2003
2   15.6  17.7  66.8 
1  Includes public offers of bonds and short-term securities.   





Fixed income securities in domestic currency 
Outstanding balances in millions of new soles 
  December 2002  11 November 2003 
Private issues    2,777    3,559 
% change        28% 
Commercial paper    604    734 





Fixed income securities in foreign currency 
Outstanding balances in millions of US dollars 
  December 2002  11 November 2003 
Private issues    1,829    1,973 
% change        8% 
Commercial paper    83    65 
Bonds   1,746    1,908 
 
Financial dollarisation has tended to fall in the last two years, with a clear increasing path for credits in 








Another step in the development of domestic financial markets is improving the efficiency of the 
payment system. In 2000, the Central Reserve Bank of Peru introduced a real-time gross settlement 
(RTGS) system. This system allows transfer of funds among financial system institutions by charging 
to their current accounts at the central bank. These operations are set and executed electronically, 
and settled on a one by one basis through a debit or credit to the current account of the involved 
financial institutions at the central bank. The RTGS system helps to eliminate the possibility of financial 
institutions overdrawing from the central bank within the day, and improves the speed and timing of 
settlements of interbank transactions in the payment system. In the near future, it is expected that the 
implementation of a delivery versus payment (DVP) system for clearing and settlement of transactions 
will minimise default risk, thus enhancing liquidity in domestic financial markets. 
Returning to international capital markets 
The central government has started to participate in international capital markets through the issuance 
of global bonds that diversify the sources for financing the fiscal deficit. After 70 years in which no 
international bonds were issued, in 2002 there were two issues totalling USD 1.9 billion (USD 1.4 billion 
in February and USD 0.5 billion in December), of which USD 0.9 billion was used for a Brady bond 
swap.  
In 2003, conditions for issuing bonds in the international market improved in terms of interest rates and 
maturities. In November 2003, the Peruvian Government placed a USD 0.5 billion bond issue with a 
30-year maturity and 8.8% yield. Although in principle this bond provides a benchmark for private 
issues in international markets, in practice Peruvian issuers have preferred the local market as a 
source of funding. This is explained by the excess liquidity accumulated by the banking system in 
previous years and the presence of institutional investors with an increasing demand for securities in 
the local market. 
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Emerging market economy bonds like Peru’s are considered high-risk assets. This implies, as some 
recent research has shown, a high and positive correlation between the EMBI+ yield of Peru and the 
yield on so-called “junk bonds” (American corporate bonds that are rated below investment grade). 
Research has also found a positive relationship between the EMBI+ spread of Peru and that of Brazil, 
which reflects the importance of regional effects (Graphs 12 and 13). 
Graph 12 




EMBI+ Peru and EMBI+ Brazil 
   
Concluding remarks 
In 2002, the Central Reserve Bank of Peru adopted an explicit inflation targeting framework. In spite of 
high financial dollarisation, a low degree of real dollarisation in the country allows an independent 
monetary policy aimed at anchoring expected inflation. The regime combines an independent 
monetary policy with a floating exchange rate. The floating exchange rate regime reduces the chances 
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However, the risks associated with a sudden and sharp depreciation of the currency are not negligible 
in a dollarised economy. With the aim of avoiding these risks, monetary policy operating procedures in 
Peru, which typically keep the interest rate within a predetermined band, contain an “escape clause” to 
be applied in circumstances of extreme exchange rate volatility. This clause allows a transitory 
increase in the policy interest rate (interbank interest rates) in order to dissuade destabilising 
speculation and calm the markets.  
In order to enhance resilience in the face of shocks, the central bank has sought to maintain adequate 
foreign exchange reserve holdings, and set high reserve requirements on dollar deposits. The 
country’s banking and insurance supervision institution (SBS) has also established a liquidity 
requirement on short-term dollar liabilities. 
The central bank conducts open market operations using its own certificates of deposit (CDBCRPs). 
Along with the CDBCRPs, liquidity is managed through short-term repurchase agreements and 
operations with treasury bills. The expansion of monetary operations with CDBCRPs allowed the 
interest rate of these securities to become a benchmark (up to three years) in the domestic financial 
market. That benchmark has been complemented by the recent development of an active public debt 
market in domestic currency. 